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1 Introduction
Innovation cooperation is a core issue in the research and in the policy agenda.
In the last decade, it has been one of the pillars of the system approach to
innovation and innovation policy, at both the national and regional level
(e.g. Lundvall, 1992; Cooke et al., 1997; Edquist, 2000). More recently, it
has stimulated the debate on the so-called “open innovation” mode (e.g.
Chesbrough et al., 2006; Dahlander and Gann, 2010) and a policy-shift
from “knowledge stocks” to “knowledge flows” (e.g. European-Commission,
2010a,b).
Cooperating with research organisations (ROs) (universities and research
institutes) is particularly important for industrial innovation. It enables
firms to access newly generated knowledge from the world of science and to
share the costs and risks of research (Mansfield, 1991, 1995; Mansfield and
Lee, 1996).1
The role of firms’ cooperation with ROs has been widely recognised
also at the regional level. Within the regional boundaries, it contributes to
shaping the ‘knowledge-base’ and the technological profile of the Regional
Innovation System (RIS) (e.g. Cooke et al., 1997; Asheim and Coenen, 2005).
Cooperating with RO is also important across the regional boundaries, in
order to allow regions to open up, enter into broader (e.g. global) innovation
networks, and upgrade their competencies (e.g. Kra¨tke and Brandt, 2009;
Chaminade, 2011).
In spite of its relevance, the results obtained by regional studies on the
cooperation between firms and ROs still hesitate to get distilled into science
and technology policies to foster it (Hassink, 2002; Todtling and Trippl, 2005).
Different reasons are responsible for that. On the one hand, the analysis of
the barriers which hamper this kind of interaction, and which thus require a
policy intervention, is quite recent and mainly focused on the national level
(e.g. Mora-Valentin et al., 2004; Bruneel et al., 2010). On the other hand,
the policy outcome in addressing these barriers is hard to identify. Industry-
research cooperation is not one-shot like, but rather evolves over time and
often becomes very unstable (Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009). Furthermore,
what innovation policy actually “adds” to the cooperative behaviours that
firms would have however established, searching for a competitive advantage,
is hard to disentangle. Non-standard econometric techniques are required,
but so far these have been mainly applied to asses the policy impact on
firms’ innovation inputs (e.g. R&D expenditure) and outputs (e.g. patents)
(Georghiou, 2004).
In order to fill this gap, we investigate the extent to which networking
1Cooperation (R&D partnerships, in particular) with other firms also plays important
functions (Kamien et al., 1992; Pisano, 1990; Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1995; Greenlee and
Cassiman, 1999) and has been attracting a lot of attention (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2004;
Hagedoorn and Van Kranenburg, 2003).
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activities firms undertake as part of a RIS are affected by an innovation sup-
porting regional scheme designed also to foster industry-research interactions:
in particular a regional R&D subsidy which includes cooperation with ROs
among the activities eligible for public funding.
We put forward a number of research hypotheses and test them in an
empirical study of the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy. Cooperation with ROs
is dealt with as an element of the “behavioural additionality” of innovation
policy (e.g. Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012). We investigate it by using an
original, firm-level dataset, containing information on policy funding, as well
as pre-policy characteristics and post-policy behaviours and performances. A
set of propensity score matching techniques is first applied to it. The effect
that an increase in the amount of subsidy has on the geographical extent of
firms’ cooperation with ROs is then investigated by applying the generalised
propensity score technique (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). This is an important
value added with respect to the extant literature.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the
relevant literature and puts forward the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3
presents the empirical application and Section 4 discusses its results. Section
5 concludes.
2 Background literature and hypotheses
The role of the link between science and technology for firms’ innovation has
been investigated since long (e.g. Allen, 1977; Tushman and Katz, 1980). A
number of empirical studies have shown that several (and radical) innovations
have their roots in such a link between firms and RO (e.g. Mansfield, 1991,
1995; Mansfield and Lee, 1996; Cockburn and Henderson, 2001). Firstly, RO
can provide firms with complementary knowledge and with other intangible
assets (e.g. human capital), which are necessary for them to innovate, but
not easily contracted and monitored through market-based transactions
(Sinha and Cusumano, 1991; Katsoutacos and Ulph, 1998). Secondly, in
partnerships with RO firms can share the risks and costs of R&D and try
to benefit from economies of scale (Hagedoorn, 1993; Tether, 2002) (on the
motivations and patterns of innovation cooperation, see Caloghirou et al.
(2003)).
Firms’ cooperation with ROs are also important at the regional level.
Along with inter-firm networks (e.g. R&D partnerships) and other institu-
tional linkages (e.g. those with local banks), they give rise to location-specific
innovation patterns, of which Regional Innovation Systems (RISs) are one
of the most celebrated example (Cooke et al., 1997). In the RIS frame-
work, industry-research interactions represent the “knowledge fabric” of
the system, where the scientific core is developed before being accessed
and transformed into new products and processes by the technology sub-
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system (Fritsch, 2001). In the companion perspectives of learning-regions
and learning-in-space (Florida, 1995; Hassink and Klaerding, 2012), these
interactions generate the “analytical knowledge base” (i.e. know-why kind
of knowledge) that activate the Science and Technology Innovation (STI)
mode (Asheim, 2012). Firms’ cooperation with ROs thus contributes to
define the “knowledge-base”2 of the region, making arise a variety of RIS
(learning regions), with different innovation potential (Asheim and Coenen,
2005, 2006) and different (possibly smart) specialization patterns (Wintjes
and Hollanders, 2011).3
Although beneficial in terms of innovation outcomes, cooperative relation-
ships between firms and ROs are hampered by several barriers, which create
the need of a policy support for them (Busom and Ferna´ndez-Ribas, 2008),
also and above at the regional level (e.g. Hassink, 2002). Irrespectively from
the actual location of the RO, regional firms could find costly to establish
and manage a relationship with partners which have different incentives and
objectives: for example, long-run, exploratory research of basic knowledge
vs. short-run, exploitative research of applied knowledge (Carayol, 2003).
Their approaches to IPOs are often conflicting, resulting in divergent quality
and evaluations of the respective patents (Valentin and Jensen, 2007). Their
stocks of knowledge capital can be quite unbalanced, hampering firms’ ab-
sorption of ROs’ knowledge (Hall et al., 2003). These implicit costs, which
have been detected in general (Bruneel et al., 2010), can be exacerbated
in those regional contexts (e.g. “peripheral” and “old industrial regions”)
whose industrial structure is dominated by SMEs characterised by a low-tech
specialisation pattern (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999; Mohnen and Hoareau,
2003; Todtling and Trippl, 2005).
Public support to firms’ innovation – such as, for example, an R&D
subsidy to firms’ networking – can be used by the recipient firms to restore
the incentives to cooperate with RO and to reduce the costs of managing
the relative partnerships (Vilasuso and Frascatore, 2000). Hence, the policy
can augment the extent and/or the number of these collaborations, 4 gen-
erating what has been called “behavioural-additionality” (e.g. ?). Indeed,
not only the policy intervention is expected to increase firms’ innovative
investment (“input-additionality”) with respect to similar ‘non-treated’ ones,
and innovative outputs (“output-additionality”). It might also lead to a
2In the region, the STI mode combines with the Doing-Using-Interacting (DUI) mode,
which generates the “synthetic” (i.e. know-how) and the “symbolic” (i.e. know-who)
knowledge-base of it. The relative weight of the two modes and their link is also part of
the knowledge-base specification of the region (Asheim, 2012).
3The cooperation between firms and RO – universities in particular – is also crucial
for regions to “generate” new entrepreneurialism and “develop” the regionalisation of
production and regulation (Gunasekara, 2006).
4Consistently with this expectation, government support appears generally significant
among the determinants of science-technology relationships (e.g. Mohnen and Hoareau,
2003; Capron and Cincera, 2003).
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“change in a company’s way of undertaking R&D” (Buisseret et al., 1995,
p.590, additional emphasis). In the case of regional firms, as we said, this
behavioural-additionality is particularly important. A R&D subsidy, which
includes cooperation with ROs among the activities eligible for public funding,
can make the knowledge-base of the RIS “thicker” and increase its innovation
potential. The following hypothesis is thus worthwhile testing:
HP1: The receipt of a R&D subsidy increases firms’ cooperation with
ROs.
Cooperation of regional firms is particularly important when the partner
is a RO located across the regional boundaries. This kind of interaction
enables regional firms to access an external (possibly international) pool of
resources and capabilities, which could complement the local ones (Asheim
and Coenen, 2006). It enhances knowledge generation and circulation in the
region (Bunnell and Coe, 2001; Bathelt et al., 2004), it increases the diversity
of the ideas within the local knowledge base (MacKinnon et al., 2002; Gertler
and Levitte, 2005; Boschma and Ter Wal, 2007), and it finally attenuates
the risk that the RIS gets locked in its current knowledge-base, making it
obsolete for competing in a global scenario (Hassink, 2005; Giuliani, 2005).5
However, extra-regional cooperation is also more costly than the regional
one, as it is characterised by lower “geographical proximity”: coeteris paribus
the costs of travelling are higher, the time for making it work is longer, and
the communication is harder (Katz, 1994; Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999; Mora-
Valentin et al., 2004). This is consistent with the studies which find that
geographical proximity facilitates interaction between science and technology
(e.g. Landry et al., 1996; Vedovello, 1997; Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Mora-
Valentin et al., 2004; Levy et al., 2009). However, this does not entail that
geographical proximity is required for successful knowledge exchange, as
organizational proximity (Knoben, 2009; Knoben et al., 2008) and/or social
proximity (Breschi and Lissoni, 2009) could compensate for its lack. Still,
relying on this non-geographical “vicinities” is not for free and could be
sometimes difficult to be pursued by regional firms.6
This argument has an important implication for the impact that the
regional policy can have on innovation cooperation. The extent to which a
policy support to R&D can cover the firms’ costs for cooperating is higher for
regional than for extra-regional cooperation. Accordingly, and still coeteris
paribus, the policy will be more likely to enhance regional cooperation than
5This issue is currently at the frontier of regional studies. Belussi et al. (2010), for
example, refer to an Open Regional Innovation System (ORIS) perspective, in which not
only do innovation processes overcome the boundaries of the organisation, but also of the
region.
6Regional firms might have to discount the “liability of foreigness” in cooperating across
the national boundaries (Zaheer, 1995), and they might suffer from the socio-cultural and
techno-economic gap which often separate partners of different regions, even in the same
national environment (e.g. Evangelista et al., 2002; Tallman and Phene, 2007).
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the extra-regional one. More precisely, in the behavioural-additionality
perspective that we are following, the simple participation in the R&D
subsidy scheme (disregarding the amount of support) can be assumed to
make the funded firms more prone to interact with regional ROs than with
extra-regional ROs, when compared with non-treated firms. In other words,
the simple receipt of the subsidy could not be enough to overcome (also) the
costs of distant cooperation and make funded firms more cooperative within
than across the regional boundaries. We thus put forward the following
hypothesis:
HP2: The receipt of a R&D subsidy increases more firms’ cooperation
with regional than with extra-regional ROs.
It should be noted that HP2 does not amount to stating that regional
innovation policy is ineffective in stimulating extra-regional cooperation with
RO. This stimulus may require a quite substantial and qualified policy action.
Investigating the circumstances under which the policy funding enhances
the interactions with extra-regional ROs is particularly important: when
firms collaborate with real research excellences located beyond the regional
borders, they can renew their knowledge base, and, in turn, that of the region
in which they operate.
From a theoretical point of view, the evolutionary-cognitive perspective
which underpins the notion of RIS (Uyarra, 2010) would predict that, for
this to be the case, regional firms would need to search by ‘exploring’ new
knowledge sources out of their current path, possibly by selecting out those
which are already ‘exploited’ and/or exploitable (March, 1991). In other
words, in order to bring new ideas in-house, regional firms should use coop-
eration to overcome the constraint of local search and creates some “holes”
in their existing geographical (and technological) context (Rosenkopf and
Almeida, 2003). In management studies, “boundary-spanning exploration”
– with respect to both the organizational and technological boundaries of
the firm – has been shown to be crucial for obtaining new knowledge with
the greatest impact on subsequent technological evolution (Rosenkopf and
Nerkar, 2001). Similarly, in regional studies, spanning the geographical
boundaries of the region has also appeared important for pursuing innovation
and competitiveness (Grotz and Braun, 1997), to a greater extent when it is
also a spanning of the national boundaries, across more substantial cultural
distances (Tallman and Phene, 2007; Phene et al., 2006). Recent empirical
contributions investigating industry-research collaborations develop from
a similar theoretical argument: firms looking for cutting-edge and diverse
research partners are more likely to establish a collaboration with a RO
disregarding the location of this latter (Belussi et al., 2010; D’Este and
Iammarino, 2010; Laursen et al., 2011). In synthesis, the real adding-value
cooperation that regional firms search across the regional boundaries can be
claimed to be that which runs against the losses of geographical proximity
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(e.g. personnel interaction, knowledge exchange, face-to-face contacts) – and
eventually of cognitive-institutional proximity (Boschma, 2005) – and face
the additional costs that distant cooperation entails.7 On this basis, the
policy role in fostering extra-regional cooperation crucially depends on the
extent to which the amount of the public subsidy can cover its costs. Hence,
in principle we can expect that the higher the amount of the R&D subsidy
is, the higher the degree of coverage, and, in turn, the higher the propensity
of cooperating extra-regionally will be.
However, an important specification should be added. Establishing a
distant cooperation with (and/or switching from a local to) an extra-regional
partner require regional firms to face important, up-front fixed costs. Local
firms need to adopt more complex (e.g. multi-language) organizational
search routines for identifying more geographically distant partners (Ebers
and Grandori, 1997; Knoben and Oerlemans, 2012). They are asked to
manage the eventual manifold ‘institutionalisation’ (e.g. different sources
of contractual rules and regulating procedures, in different geographical
contexts) of the cooperative relationship (Ranson et al., 1980; Bonaccorsi
and Piccaluga, 1994). Last, but not least, they need to build-up a more
powerful absorptive capacity (mainly, through R&D and human capital
investments) for accessing and assimilating the knowledge of more cognitively
distant and/or still unexplored sources (Nooteboom, 2000). This is a crucial
aspect as the search for geographically distant RO is also motivated by the
firm’s willingness to interact with brand-new and unique knowledge sources
(e.g. Belussi et al., 2010; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010; Laursen et al., 2011).
In other words, these are the fixed costs implied by the loss of geographical
proximity that firms need to offset for cooperating successfully.8
The need to overcome these costs can create indivisibility in the ‘pro-
duction’ of extra-regional cooperation. Regional firms could thus find this
cooperation inconvenient, unless it overcomes a minimum efficient scale in
terms of number or/and size of innovative projects. The policy implication
of this argument is quite straightforward. Suppose that in order to stimulate
regional firms to cooperate more extra-region, policy-makers think to increase
the amount of the R&D subsidy. Unless this amount would allow them to
7It should be noted that we are not claiming that distant cooperation is better than
close one for regional innovativeness, as much as we did not claim the reverse in presenting
HP2. We rather claim that the two kinds of cooperation are both useful, but for different
purposes and with respect to different partners (Brostro¨m, 2010; Ponds et al., 2007). In
this last respect, the hypothesis that a geographical variety of knowledge-links could be the
strategy to reach a higher innovative performance appears particularly interesting (Knoben
and Oerlemans, 2012).
8As Brostro¨m (2010) puts it, the capacity that certain firms can have to offset these
costs, and to fine-tune close and distant cooperation along the R&D cycle, would explain
the apparent contradictory results which have been found about the non-bounding role of
geographical distance for the success of university–industry interaction (Beise and Stahl,
1999; Zucker and Darby, 2001; Schartinger et al., 2002).
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reach the minimum scale to cover the fixed costs, this attempt will not work.
For example, a small scale subsidy, or a series of them, which just partially
contribute to the costs of extra-regional cooperation, would not affect the
decision of the recipient firms to cooperate across the region.
Our argumentation lead, thus, to the following hypothesis:
HP3: Firms’ propensity to extend the cooperation with RO beyond the
regional borders increases by increasing the amount of R&D subsidy, providing
that this latter overcomes a minimum efficient scale
The actual specification of this minimum threshold is of course an empir-
ical issue, specific to both the regional context and the structural features
of the regional firms. Our concern for testing this hypothesis is simply that
the additionality of the regional subsidy with respect to an extra-regional
cooperative behaviour does not appear significant for any (increasing) level
of the subsidy, but only above a certain one.
Let us now turn to the hypothesis testing.
3 Empirical application
3.1 Empirical context
The empirical application through which the previous hypotheses are tested
refers to the North-East Italy region (NUTS2-level) of Emilia-Romagna (ER).
The region has a population of nearly 4.5 million people and accounts
for about 9% of the national GDP (slightly more than 10% of the national
industrial production).9 The characteristics of its production structure are
quite well-know in regional studies. ER has a high density of SMEs, with
a pervasive co-location in highly specialised local production systems. ER
firms benefit from the diffuse social capital of the industrial districts of the
region, a deeply rooted unionism – especially strong in the most industrialised
provinces (e.g. Reggio Emilia) – and an articulated institutional set-up of
business and research organisations. All these elements have made of the
region a successful milieu, which has become known as the “Emilian model”
(Brusco, 1982).
The region also has a remarkable record in innovation (Antonioli et al.,
2011). According to the Regional Innovation Scoreboard (Hollanders et al.,
2009), both in 2004 and in 2006, ER is a medium-high innovative region at
the EU27 level (the only one in Italy, along with Lombardy). The scoreboard
analysis shows that this position is mainly due to a good ranking in the
firms’ activity indicator, which mainly captures their innovative efforts.10 On
9Our own elaborations drawing on: “Istat - GeoDemo Statistics”; “Istat - Regional
Economic Accounts”; “Eurostat - Regional Statistics Database”.
10Business R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP; non-R&D innovation expenditures;
SMEs innovating in-house; SMEs cooperation for innovation; EPO patents per million
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the other hand, the weak presence of some innovation enablers11 represents
an important innovation drawback of the region. In comparison with other
regions in Italy, ER appears closer to those system properties – in particular,
the extent of networking activities and clusters – which can be used to
identify a RIS (Cooke et al., 1997). However, a study based on the First
Community Innovation Survey (Evangelista et al., 2002) has shown that
the constitutive linkages of the RIS, both in the business realm and in the
science-industry link, turn out to be quite informal and “loosely structured”.
The ER RIS thus actually emerges as an “informal learning system”. This
picture is confirmed by more recent studies (e.g. Uyarra, 2010), which point
to the important role of innovation policy in making the RIS work.
Innovation policy has always been a key-driver in the evolution of the
Emilian RIS. Its role has been more pivotal than in other regional contexts
(Bianchi and Giordani, 1993). An important instrument in the ER policy-
space is represented by the so-called “Regional Programme for Industrial
Research, Innovation and Technology Transfer” (PRRIITT), launched for
the first time in 2003 (Marzocchi, 2009). This instrument conjugates the
attempts of the regional policy-makers to mitigate the weaknesses of the RIS
and to exploit the peculiar strengths given by the firms’ dynamism in terms
of innovation activities.
The present application makes use of this instrument for testing the
hypotheses of Section 2. In particular, we focus on the first two calls
(February and September 2004) of the “Measure 3.1 A” included in the
PRRIITT. This measure was devised to sustain industrial research and pre-
competitive development through more detailed objectives than a general
R&D subsidy. Particular important in the scheme is the reinforcement of
the collaboration among the components of the RIS, namely between firms
and research organisations.12 With this respect, it is worth stressing that
cooperation with ROs (regional and extra-regional), was included among
the activities eligible for funding -with higher percentages of public support
than other types of expenditures-, but was neither a requirement nor an
explicit criterion for the allocation of the policy incentives. Accordingly, this
application reveals particularly suitable for testing our hypotheses.
Regional funds were allocated on the basis of the assessment that an inde-
pendent committee of experts made of the submitted innovation projects.13
population.
11Population with tertiary education per 100 population aged 25-64; participation in
life-long learning per 100 population aged 25-64; public R&D expenditures as percentage
of GDP; broadband access.
12Other objectives include: the creation of new R&D employment opportunities, the
development of new technologies, and the adoption of intellectual property rights.
13The committee evaluated each project along several dimensions (each one with a
different total potential score): technical-scientific aspects (45 points); economic-financial
aspects (20 points); managerial aspects (20 points); regional impact (15 points). The
threshold to get funded was then fixed to 75. The eligible firms were then subsidised by
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The overall number of projects subsidised through the two calls was 529,
presented by a total of 557 recipient firms. The total cost of the projects
proposed by the beneficiaries was about 236 million Euros and the public
funding about 96 million, covering around 40% of the total projects’ cost.
The average regional contribution was of 175,000 Euros per-project.
3.2 Data
In order to test our hypotheses, we rely on a unique dataset. Its starting point
is a set of detailed and precise information on the amount and characteristics
of the subsidy (PRRIITT measure 3.1 A). By focusing on a single region, we
have been able to obtain this information from the regional policy makers.
This information has been then integrated with other two firm-level data
sources. The first of these is an original Community Innovation Survey
(CIS)-kind of survey, carried out in 2009 by Antonioli et al. (2011) on 555
ER manufacturing firms (with at least 20 employees). The second data
source is the AIDA-BureauVanDijk database, from which we extracted firms’
balance-sheets information.
The CIS-type survey contains detailed information on structural and
organisational characteristics of the surveyed firms, and on their innovation
strategies. The random sample of 555 firms is stratified by size, province
(geographic location at NUTS 3 level) and sector. The information collected
mainly refers to the post-policy period: years 2006-2008.
Through balance-sheets, on the other hand, we obtained a number of
structural information (e.g. intramural R&D and advertising) for the pre-
policy period (year 2003). As we will see in the following, these are used,
together with (supposed) time invariant firms’ characteristics drawn from
the survey, as covariates for the estimation of our econometric models.
After the merging procedure, we were left with a working sample of 408
firms: 99 subsidised, and 309 non-subsidised with the PRIITT Measure 3.1
A. The 99 firms show a distribution by size (SMEs and large firms) and
sector (Pavitt/OECD taxonomy) similar to that of all the manufacturing
firms (with more than 20 employees) that received the regional R&D subsidy
(Table B5).
3.3 Econometric strategy
The strategy we use to test the first two hypotheses (HP1-HP2) is an
established one in the recent empirical literature on the impact of R&D
subsidies (e.g Fier et al., 2006; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Busom and
Ferna´ndez-Ribas, 2008; Ferna´ndez-Ribas and Shapira, 2009). Given the
grants covering up to 50% of the total cost of the industrial research activities and up to
25% (35% for SMEs) of the total cost of the precompetitive development activities.
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non-exogeneity of the policy support 14, and the related problems of an
OLS model, the estimation of its impact can make use of a Propensity Score
Matching (PSM) approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In brief, the
PSM tries to get an estimate of the Average Treatment effect on the Treated
(ATT ) of the policy, defined as:
ATT = E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1) = E(Y1|D = 1)− E(Y0|D = 1) (1)
Y1 and Y0 denote the value of a certain outcome variable in the presence
and absence of the policy (treatment), respectively. D denotes the status
of the policy (treatment): D = 1, administrated (treated); D = 0, non-
administrated (non treated).
In Eq.(1), E(Y0|D = 1) is by definition non-observable. Hence, it needs
to be substituted by referring to a suitable “counter-factual” of firms that
did not received the policy support. To control for the selection bias (on
observables), and make sure that the difference in the outcome of the two
groups is exclusively due to the policy intervention, treated firms are matched
with non treated ones on the basis of the propensity score, Pr(D = 1|X)
(or P (X)). This latter represents the probability of being treated given a
set of pre-treatment characteristics, X, which are supposed to affect both
the treatment and the outcome. In so doing, the PSM estimate of ATT is
given by:
ATTPSM = EP (X)|D=1 {E [Y1|D = 1, P (X)]− E[Y0|D = 0, P (X)]} (2)
where P (X) is estimated with a probit model.
To estimate Eq(2), we use a set of matching procedures15, to have an
information on the stability and, indirectly, on the reliability of the evidence.
These procedures differ in the selection and weightening of the non treated
firms to be used as matches, as well as in the capacity to trade between
efficiency and bias reduction (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Smith and Todd,
2005). The common support condition is imposed to all the matching
procedures. 16 We finally test the quality of the matching, by controlling
that beneficiaries and matched controls are correctly aligned with respect to
the vector of the covariates X.17
14One just needs to think about the “picking the winner” or the “aiding the poor”
strategy with which the R&D subsidy can be devised (Cerulli, 2010).
15In particular, the 5 nearest-neighbours, the caliper and the kernel, for which see Becker
and Ichino (2002); Cameron and Trivedi (2009); Smith and Todd (2005); Caliendo and
Kopeinig (2008).
16This serves to guarantee the presence of suitable counterfactual firms for each treated.
In addition to the “minima and maxima” comparison, the 5 nearest-neighbours matching
is implemented by imposing the common support condition also with a 1% “trimming”
procedure (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
17Drawing on Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), three tests on the quality of the matching
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In order to test HP3, an original “continuous treatment” approach is used:
the Generalised Propensity Score method (GPS) (Hirano and Imbens, 2004;
Bia and Mattei, 2008). In particular, the GPS is here used to estimate, for
a set of subsidy levels, the effect of an additional amount of public support.
In technical terms, given the treatment, T , and a set of covariates, X,
which explain its administration, the Generalised Propensity Score, R, is
defined as (Hirano and Imbens, 2004):
R = r(T,X) (3)
where the propensity function r(t, x) is the conditional density of the
actual treatment, t, given the observed covariates, x.
Like the propensity score, also the GPS has a balancing property.18
Hirano and Imbens (2004) have demonstrated that, when this balancing
propriety is associated with a suitable unconfoundedness assumption, the
treatment is unconfounded given the GPS. Hence, the GPS can be used to
eliminate the bias in the estimation of the treatment effect, which is due to
differences in the covariates.
Following Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Bia and Mattei (2008), a three-
step estimation strategy, illustrated in Appendix A, is employed. Two
specific elements of it are however worthwhile clarifying at this stage. First
of all, our HP3 refers to the effect of an extra amount of subsidy, on a
set of cooperation decisions of discretely increasing geographical distance:
no-cooperation, cooperation with a regional partner, and cooperation with an
extra-regional partner. Therefore, step-two of the GPS strategy is estimated
with an ordered probit model. Secondly, the choice of the variation of the
treatment, for analysing the incremental effects of the policy, inevitably
suffers from ad-hocness. In order to reduce it, the characteristics of the
investigated context has been considered (Section 3.1). As the average
regional contribution was equal to 175,000 Euros, ∆t has been heuristically
looked for among a set of options and chosen at 20,000 Euros. 19
have been carried out. A first one has checked the reduction, after the matching, of the
joint significance of probit model for the propensity score estimation. A second test has
checked the reduction, after the matching, of the pseudo-R2 of the probit model. Third,
a regression-based t-test on the differences in the covariates means has been run. The
results of these tests, available upon request, largely support the quality of the matching
procedures.
18Within strata with the same value of r(t, x), the probability that T = t does not
depend on X.
19This is approximately the cost of an extra temporary contract for a junior researcher in
a typical department of a regional university/institute. As a robustness check, we carried
out our analysis with different values of ∆t, namely 1.00 Euro, 1,000 Euros, and 40,000
Euros.
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3.4 Variables
The operationalisation of the previous econometric approach requires us to
create two sets of variables. Firstly, a set of suitable covariates, X, need
to be included in the estimation of the propensity score and of the GPS.
Secondly, we need a set of outcome variables, which capture the impact on
the firms’ cooperation strategy generated by the receipt of the R&D subsidy
(HP1-HP2) and by its amount (HP3).
As for the covariates, these either reflect time-inviant characteristics or
are cconsidered at a time (mainly in the year 2003), which is beforehand the
policy (administrated in the year 2004). The first two of them control for the
most debated specificity factors of the innovation process (e.g. Malerba, 2002;
Cohen, 2010), that is: the firm’s sector – a set of dummies (PAV ITT1−
PAV ITT5) for its belonging to the Pavitt/OECD sectors – and its size –
the natural logarithm of the number of its employees (lnEMP2003).
A second group of controls tries to account for the intra-RIS heterogeneity
in firms’ innovation process (Todtling and Trippl, 2005). This is particularly
necessary in the specific case of the ER region given the presence of different
industrial districts, which at least partially overlap with its administrative
provinces (Mazzanti et al., 2009; Antonioli et al., 2010). Accordingly, we
include a set of dummies (GEO1−GEO10) that capture the firm’s location
in terms of provinces (NUTS 3-level).
A third group of controls tries to get closer to the pre-policy features
of the firms which affect the policy administration. Firstly, their pre-policy
expenditure (per capita) in intramural R&D and advertising, RDADV2003,
is considered as a proxy of their innovative profile.20 Our expectation is
that the innovation history of the firm affects its decision to apply for public
subsidies. In particular, firms with a high (antecedent) R&D intensity might
be willing to use the subsidy to make further steps along their innovation
path.
Secondly, the financial condition of the firm is proxied by its cash-flow per
capita (CASHFLOW2003) and its short-term debt index (FINCONST2003).
The former accounts for the firm’s availability of financial resources to invest
in innovation, without recurring to external sources. The latter could instead
signal the presence of eventual financial constraints, which prevent firms
from investing in R&D.21 Our expectation is that the financial barriers of
the firms might spur them to apply for the subsidy.
Apart from the sectoral and geographical dummies, all the considered
covariates are of a continuous nature. This fact enhances the quality of the
20Unfortunately, disaggregated data for the two kinds of expenditure were not available.
On the other hand, recent studies are emerging on their complementary in the current
open-innovation and demand-led paradigm (e.g. Perks et al., 2009).
21The short-term debt is here considered to be probably more relevant than the long-term
one, given the contingent nature of the decision to plan a R&D project and thus apply for
a subsidy.
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estimates. Furthermore, nearly all of them are used in the specification of
both the propensity score and the GPS. Only few of them had to be dropped
to respect the balancing propriety of the latter: the provincial dummies
(GEO1−GEO10) and the expenditure in R&D and advertising in year 2003
(RDADV2003).
As far as the variables of policy-outcome are concerned, we distinguish
between the cooperation with universities and research insitutes This has
been done in order to control whether, as some literature suggests (e.g.
To¨dtling et al., 2009), the specific type of partner can have a role in chan-
neling the cooperative-additionality of the policy.22 In particular, to test
HP1 and HP2 we consider whether in the aftermath of the policy (period
2006-2008), the firms had cooperation agreements in place with: regional uni-
versities (COOPUNIREG) and research institutes (COOPRESINSREG);
extra-regional universities (COOPUNIEXTRA) and research institutes
(COOPRESINSEXTRA).
Finally, in order to test HP3, we use two ordinal variables – COOPUNIORD
and COOPRESINSORD – which, still referring to the post-policy period
(2006-2008), account for the geographical range of the interactions between
funded firms and ROs. Each of them takes value 0, in case of no cooper-
ation with ROs, respectively; 1, in case of cooperation with at least one
regional university or research institute, respectively; 2, in case the firm has
cooperated with at least one extra-regional university or research institute,
respectively.
Tables B6 and B7 present the main descriptive statistics of the covariates
and of the outcome variables we have built up.
4 Results
Before looking at the PSM estimates for the first two hypothesis, let us
consider the underlying probit estimation (Table 1).
[Table 1 around here]
As expected, the R&D support has a higher probability of being searched/received
by firms which already have an internal research (and advertising) experience
(RDADV2003).
23 Similarly, also the sector in which the firms operate is an
22It should be noted that available data do not allow us to distinguish public from private
research institutes. For the private ones, some of the arguments we have used to support
our hypotheses might require some adaptations: for example, rivalry and competitive issues
might actually emerge with respect to them. Of the spurious nature of this variable we
will thus have to take care in the discussion of the relevant results.
23R&D could equally increase willingness and capacity of firms to apply for the policy.
Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish whether previous engagement in R&D increases
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important determinant for participation in the subsidy scheme. As expected,
firms operating in more dynamic and technology-intensive sectors are more
likely to be subsidized. In addition to scale-intensive firms (PAVITT4),
science-based companies (PAVITT3) and firms operating in the propulsive
district core of the ER region, characterized by specialized suppliers sectors
(PAVITT5), have a higher probability of receiving the subsidy. A sound,
rather than a weak, financial condition of the firms increases their probability
of being funded by the subsidy (FINCONST2003 is significantly negative)
too. The fact that financial soundness helps firms to show/make a more
efficient use of the subsidy is a tentative explanation for this result. The re-
gional policy in this RIS seems to help innovative firms to breed their success
in innovation: in brief, a “picking the winner” kind of policy (Cerulli, 2010).
This result actually makes necessary to use the econometric methodology we
have chosen and to investigate the relative ATT .
Table 2 shows that the ATT of the policy on the firms’ cooperation with
ROs is positive and significant. Funded firms are actually more likely to
cooperate with ROs than non-funded ones, irrespectively from the nature
of the research partner and from its location. The result is extremely
robust across all the four matching procedures employed. HP1 is thus largely
supported. The relationship between local firms and ROs actually seems to be
affected by costly barriers (e.g. incentive conflicts and resource asymmetries
(e.g. Bruneel et al., 2010)), which the policy seems able to attenuate. Within
the region, the ATT of the policy is higher with respect to universities
(from +37.4% to +40.2%) than with respect to research institutes (from
+32.8% to +33.5%), while the opposite is true across the regional boundaries
(from +13.0% to +19.8%, and from +19.3% to +22.6%, respectively). This
is another interesting result. The simple fact of receiving a subsidy of a
certain amount spurs firms to increase their collaboration (with respect
to the non treated firms) by favoring the search for a more basic kind of
knowledge, within the region, and a more applied one, outside of it. In
synthesis, the policy actually seems to have added something to cooperatve
behaviour of regional firms.24 Given the weaknesses the ER RIS in terms
of “innovation enablers” (Hollanders et al., 2009), and the lack of those
formal, explicit relationships (Evangelista et al., 2002), which are typical of
the science-technology link, this result suggests an “illuminated” action by
the policy-makers of the region.
[Table 2 around here]
awareness of the need to innovate, and thus the interest/propensity to submit projects,
rather than the capacity to present more promising and well-planned proposals.
24A different study on the same sample reinforces this result by looking at other innovative
behaviours (Antonioli et al., 2012). In particular, funded firms are more likely (from +16.6%
to +20.0%) to report an upgrading in their competencies, when compared to similar non-
subsidised companies.
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The comparison between the ATT of the policy within and across the
region largely supports also HP2. With respect to non-funded ones, funded
firms are actually more likely to cooperate with regional (from +37.4% to
+40.2%) than with extra-regional universities (from +13.0% to +19.8%), and
the same holds true for regional and extra-regional research institutes (from
+32.8% to +33.5%, and from +19.3% to +22.6%, respectively). This result is
also extremely robust and interesting for its implications. On the one hand,
it confirms the theoretical hypothesis that ‘geographical-proximity’ could
actually favor cooperation with ROs (Boschma, 2005; Ponds et al., 2007).
Closer cooperation is actually more handly activable than the distant one by
the contribution of the public policy. On the other hand, it remains true that
the policy has some additionality in terms of extra-regional cooperation too.
Given the role that this kind of relationship plays in opening-up the RIS, by
allowing the regional firms to renew the local knowledge base (e.g. Hassink,
2005), this is another very welcomed result of the policy in this RIS.
Let us now consider the test of HP3, which relies on the use of the GPS.25
HP3 turns out to be generally supported. Above a threshold of public
funding, an increase of the R&D subsidy significantly affects the likelihood of
widening the geographical extent of the cooperation with ROs. By considering
an increase of 20,000 (40,000) Euros, this threshold is: 200,000 (180,000)
Euros, with respect to research institutes (Tables ??) and 180,000 (160,000)
Euros, with respect to universities (Tables ??). This is quite interesting, as it
supports the argument that research collaborations are affected by up-front,
fixed costs, which could create indivisibility problems. In other words, these
are costs which can not be compensated by cumulating moderated policy
interventions over time, but only with a public funding above a minimum
(efficient) scale.26 Although the difference is not large, the minimum efficient
scale for cooperating extra-region appears higher with respect to research
institutes than universities. In the former case, the collaborative project
could entail a more direct application of the results to the business realm
than in the latter case (e.g., the exploitation of a certain patent, rather than
its obtainment), and the fixed costs could thus be comparatively higher.
Apart from the presence of a minimum efficient scale of public funding,
the results are different depending on the nature the partner, but overall still
support our HP3. This is confirmed when considering the cooperation with
research institutes (Table ??).27 The increase of the policy support above
25Maximum likelihood estimation of the GPS is reported in Table B8. In what follows,
we report and comment the results obtained with ∆t values of 20,000 Euros and 40,000
Euros only. Further comments on the robustness of the test will be added at the end of
this section.
26Participating to an international research programme, just to make an extreme example,
might require such a high mobility and training costs for the managers (explicit and
implicit), to be worthwhile evaluating only if its budget is consistent enough and the public
contribution covers it nearly entirely.
27See also the treatment effect functions in Figure B1
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the minimum threshold increases the likelihood that the funded firms extend
the geographical range of this collaboration across the region (Y = 2). With
∆t = 20,000, the range of the treatment effects spans from +6.4% to +14%.
The policy could actually help regional firms in using boundary-spanning
alliances to overcome the local search for research institutes, by covering
the increasing costs of this spanning. To be sure, rather than diminished
(if not even ‘overcome’ (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003)), the local search is
left unaltered by the increase in the policy intervention (i.e., Y = 1 is not
significantly affected by it. 28 In other words, rather than using the policy
support for shifting from a local to a global (or simply external) cooperative
pattern with research institutes, regional firms appear more inclined to keep
the former and possibly make it ‘glo-cal’ (Onsager et al., 2007).
[Table 3 around here]
HP3 does find support also when the interaction with extra-regional
universities is considered (Table ??).29 Adding an extra amount of treatment
above the threshold enhances the firms’ propensity to cooperate with an
extra-regional university (Y = 2): in a measure which spans from +5.6% to +
20.4%, for an increase of 20,000 Euros. Once more, the policy appears to have
a potential role in allowing regional firms to bear the costs of the boundary-
spanning exploration of excellent university centres. However, differently
from what has emerged for the collaborations with research institutes, the
increasing attitude to cooperate with extra-regional academic partners is
this time associated to a decreasing propensity to collaborate with a regional
university (Y = 1). Above the threshold (of 180,000 Euros), an extra
amount of subsidy (of 20,000 Euros) induces firms to cooperate less with
regional academic partners: from -2.4% to -15.9%. 30 This result seems to
suggest a sort of substitution effect, between an “inward-looking” and an
“outward-looking” cooperation strategy in the case of universities. Its possible
explanation can be found in the kind of knowledge which the two types
of interactions are likely to generate. Unlike that with research institutes,
the cooperation with academic partners is generally carried out within the
insitutional grids of internationally codified scientific fields, and with a
peer-review system which is also relative more homogeneous geographically.
28Although with a different threshold value (i.e. 180,000 rather than 200,000 Euros), and
with a different range of the treatment effects for Y = 2 – that is from +9.7% to +30.1% –
the results we have obtained for the interaction with research institutes are confirmed for
∆t = 40,000 Euros.
29See also the treatment effect functions reported in Figure B2)
30Once more, these results are robust with respect to the selected ∆ of the treatment (i.e.
40,000 Euros), although with a different threshold (160,000 Euros), and different ranges in
the effect for Y = 2 (from +7% to +39.1%) and for Y = 1 (from -8.6% to -32.8%).
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Therefore, in the cooperation with local universities, regional firms could
find access to an analytical kind of knowledge which is not too dissimilar
– at least in terms of breath – from that available outside the regional
borders. As a consequence, when, due to the public support, firms have
the possibility to deal with the higher cost of a distant cooperation, the
collaborations with regional universities are substituted by interactions with
extra-regional academic institutes, which probably offer alike, but more
qualitatively advanced – in terms of depth – and suitable research capabilities.
[Table 4 around here]
In concluding, we should further note that the obtained results are largely
robust across the ∆t values that we have selected.31 As a further robustness
check, we have also tried to carry out our analysis by employing a different
type of “treatment”. Instead of the actual amount of the subsidy, we have
used the intensity of the subsidy, that is, the ratio between the subsidy and
the total amount of the funded project. However, the results show that this
is neither particularly meaningful, nor a viable way to proceed in the context
of our empirical application. Given also the design of the policy intervention
under consideration, which supported the different types of expenditures
with fixed percentages, the ratio between the subsidy and the total amount
of the project turns out to be extremely concentrated (e.g. the 65% of the
observations have a subsidy intensity ratio between 35%-45%). In conclusion,
this very low variability made the estimation of the GPS (i.e. the first step
of the procedure described in Appendix A) not feasible.
5 Conclusions
The increase of industry-research cooperation represents an important objec-
tive to be pursued by the policy makers. Within the region, it strengthens
the knowledge-base which becomes available to the local firms for innovat-
ing. Across the regional boundaries, it allows them to tap-into different
knowledge sources for proposing novel business solutions in the region. A
31The evidence emerging from the estimates which employ ∆t values of 1.00 Euro and
1,000 Euros has not been illustrated for the sake of parsimony. These additional amounts
of subsidy can be considered quite small, when compared to the cost of establishing and
managing a cooperation with a research organisation. Accordingly, we could expect that
they are not able to have economically meaningful impacts. The results, still available
upon request, confirms this point: even if consistent with those presented, in terms of
(thresholds of) significance, the treatment effects are indeed very low in terms of magnitude.
Tables B9 and B10, which report the standard “marginal effects” of an extra amount of
public funding, clearly illustrate this point.
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simple instrument like an R&D subsidy appears to be quite effective in both
respects.
This is the first important result of the paper. The significant and
robust cooperative-additionality revealed by the investigated policy-scheme,
suggests us that innovation cooperation is actually affected by costly barriers
(Lo´pez-Mart´ınez et al., 1994; Bruneel et al., 2010). Therefore, the policy
maker can have an important role in addressing this failure in the functioning
of the RIS.
A further insight emerging from our analysis is the fact that the simple
receipt of the subsidy induce local firms to increase their cooperation with
ROs more within the region, than across its boundaries. This suggests that,
although it can be overcome by relying on other kind of proximities (Boschma,
2005; Breschi and Lissoni, 2009), the geographical distance of the partner still
affects the priority that the local firms attach to their cooperative projects.
A priority that the simple provision of some contribution to R&D is not able
to change.
Moving from this point, our paper has investigated the circustances under
which the public support to R&D activities can stimulate the extension of
the geographical range of the cooperation with ROs. Given the presence
of indivisible fixed costs that characterise the collaboration with distant
research partners,
Our evidence has shown that the amount of subsidy, rather than its
simple receipt, is able to affect the geographical range of the cooperation
with ROs. Our results suggest that the presence of indivisible fixed costs
in extra-regional cooperation, which can be overcome with the contribution
of the policy intervention only in case this latter is higher than a certain
threshold. Providing the public support is above this minimum threshold, an
additional amount of subsidy increases firms’ propensity to engage in more
costly extra-regional cooperation, through which firms can tap cutting-edge
and unique research capabilities. Whether this occurs, or not, at the expenses
of a reduction in the propensity to cooperate within the regional borders is
another important issue. Quite interestingly, our application shows that the
nature of the partner, and of the knowledge which is generated by interacting
with it, is a relevant aspect for the eventual shift from an inward (local)
to an outward (global) cooperative strategy. These insights have two main
implications for policy making. First, investigating which is the minimum
scale for extra-regional cooperation to be effective for the local firms, and
devise a consistent contribution, becomes an important task for policy makers.
Moreover, an accurate screening of the RO through which extra-regional
cooperation is expected to provide its gains thus becomes another important
policy task.
Of course, the results here presented might be sensible to the characteris-
tics of the context and of the policy considered in the paper: in particular,
the fact that SMEs were the main beneficiaries of the intervention, and the
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low average public support. Even so, the results of the present study can
have some general value in regional studies: despite its idiosyncratic techno-
economic characteristics (Brusco, 1982; Hollanders et al., 2009), ER has been
found to be a good approximation of the theoretical RIS conceptualisation
(e.g. Evangelista et al., 2002) and a benchmark of an industrial-district based
model for other countries (e.g. Molina-Morales, 2001; Humphrey, 1995). Fur-
thermore, the same results have been obtained with an original empirical
approach. A propensity score matching method, for the analysis of the effects
of the participation in the R&D subsidy, has been extended with a generalised
propensity score analysis of the impact generated by the increasing amount
of public support. At methodological level, this extension has also a general
value.
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Covariates Coeff. S.E.
lnEMP2003 0.119 0.083
GEO1 3.420*** 1.146
GEO2 1.755* 1.053
GEO3 0.789 1.155
GEO5 1.839* 1.057
GEO6 2.639** 1.096
GEO7 1.531 1.077
GEO8 2.184** 1.083
GEO9 1.849* 1.064
GEO10 1.187 1.122
PAVITT1 0.148 0.29
PAVITT3 1.361*** 0.326
PAVITT4 0.575** 0.279
PAVITT5 0.726*** 0.255
FINCONST2003 -0.881* 0.525
CASHFLOW2003 -0.005 0.005
RDADV2003 0.162*** 0.043
cons -2.671** 1.219
N = 408
Pseudo R2 = 0.217
Prob≥ χ2 0.000
***, **, *: 1%, 5%, 10% significance
VIF test excludes multicollinearity
(all VIF values lower than 10)
Table 1: Probit estimation of the propensity score
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A Three-step estimation strategy for GPS
In step one, the conditional distribution of the treatment, Ti, given the
covariates, Xi, is estimated, by assuming it – or a suitable transformation of
it g(Ti) – normally distributed:
g(Ti)|Xi ≈ N
{
h(γ,Xi), σ
2
}
(4)
where h(γ,Xi) is a function of the covariates, which depends on a vector
of parameters, γ, and g is a logaritmic transformation of the treatment, T .
Estimating the parameters γ and σ2 by maximum likelihood, the GPS
for each firm, i, can be obtained as:
Rˆi =
1√
2piσˆ2
exp
{
− 1
2σˆ2
[g(Ti)− h(γˆ, Xi)]2
}
(5)
With the estimated GPS, the normality of g(Ti) and the fulfillment of
the assumption on the balancing property can be finally tested.
In step two, in order to “maximise” the joint significance and the goodness
of its fit, the conditional expectation of the outcome Yi, given Ti and Ri, is
modelled and estimated as follows:
E(Yi|Ti, Ri) = a0 + a1Ti + a2T 2i + a3Ri (6)
The last step of the procedure consists of estimating the treatment effect
of an additional amount of subsidy, getting the standard errors through a
bootstrapping procedure. Given the parameters estimated in the previous
stage, the average potential outcome at level t of treatment is given by:
E
[
ˆY (t)
]
=
1
N
n∑
i
[
aˆ0 + aˆ1t+ aˆ2t
2 + aˆ3rˆ(t,Xi)
]
(7)
The treatment effect for each level of relevant level of the treatment, t, is
calculated as the difference between Eq(7), at level t+ ∆t, and Eq(7) at t.
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B Data appendix
Recipient population distribution SMEs Large Total Total
(< 250 employees) (= 250 employees) % (a.v.)
% %
Sector
PAVITT1 (Labour Intensive) 8.55 0.43 8.97 21
PAVITT2 (Resource Intensive) 9.83 2.56 12.39 29
PAVITT3 (Science Based) 11.11 1.28 12.39 29
PAVITT4 (Scale Intensive) 14.96 4.7 19.66 46
PAVITT5 (Specialised Suppliers) 39.74 6.84 46.58 109
Total 84.19 15.81
Total (a.v.) 197 37 234
Recipient sample distribution SMEs Large Total Total
% % % (a.v.)
Sector
PAVITT1 (Labour Intensive) 9.09 1.01 11.11 11
PAVITT2 (Resource Intensive) 7.07 2.02 9.09 9
PAVITT3 (Science Based) 15.16 1.01 16.16 16
PAVITT4 (Scale Intensive) 14.15 7.07 21.21 21
PAVITT5 (Specialised Suppliers) 34.34 8.08 42.42 42
Total 80.81 19.19
Total (a.v.) 80 19 99
Table 5: Sample representativeness
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Overall Mean Mean
mean subs. non subs. Min. Max.
408 obs 99 obs 309 obs
Cooperation with
research organizations (ROs)
Intra-RIS
COOPUNIREG 0.37 0.717 0.259 0 1
COOPRESINSREG 0.311 0.566 0.229 0 1
Extra-RIS
COOPUNIEXTRA 0.145 0.343 0.081 0 1
COOPRESINSTEXTRA 0.199 0.394 0.136 0 1
Geographical range
of cooperation with
research organizations (ROs)
COOPRESINSORD 0.654 1.192 0.482 0 2
COOPUNIORD 0.596 1.212 0.398 0 2
Table 7: Outcome variables
Covariates Coeff. S.E.
lnEMP2003 0.057* 0.03
PAVITT1 0.203 0.133
PAVITT3 0.210* 0.126
PAVITT4 0.073 0.12
PAVITT5 0.206* 0.111
FINCONST2003 -0.525*** 0.182
CASHFLOW2003 0.000 0.003
cons 12.100*** 0.221
N = 99
Pseudo R2 = 0.293
Prob≥ χ2 0.009
***, **, *: 1%, 5%, 10% significane
VIF test excludes multicollinearity
(all VIF values lower than 10)
Critical values of the two sided t-test
(df = 100): 10%: 1.660; 5%: 1.984; 1%: 2.626
Table 8: Maximum likelihood estimation of the generalised propensity score
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